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Introduction
Technology under the umbrella term ‘artificial  intelligence’  (AI) has reached some new
heights in the last decade, resulting in widespread interest and usage. Unfortunately, this is
often  accompanied  with  exaggerated  claims,  conflicting  predictions  and  opinions,
sometimes also a lack of  understanding over the inner workings of these technologies.
What  is  clear,  however,  is  that  we  have  the  ability  to  create  systems that  outperform
humans and we are eager to put them to use. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze AI from the perspective of risks. The main
goal is to show that already existing AI systems (what are often called ‘narrow AI’) pose
serious risks, not merely themselves, but how they are intentionally used by human beings.
I define risks in a relatively straightforward way – a risk is the potential to lose
something of value. Risks can range in terms of scope from small to existential, they can be
likely or unlikely, predictable or unpredictable, affect groups of people, all of humanity or
the  planet  as  a  whole.  ‘Artificial  intelligence’  is  defined  broadly  as  intelligence
demonstrated by machines. Most current AI systems can be rightly said to lack generality
or indeed lack most characteristics of human intelligence, yet this does not mean that they
are not powerful or do not pose risks.
The motivation for writing on this topic stems from three facts. Firstly, we define
and  distinguish  ourselves  from  other  species  largely  through  our  intelligence,  which
permits us to substantially change our environment to fit our goals, but also to change our
goals  themselves.  We now have the  ability  to  create  systems that  potentially  match or
surpass our abilities. There are many ways how these systems can end up imperfect and it
is  up  to  us  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  this  happening.  This  requires  careful
acknowledgment of what and how can go wrong.
Secondly, there has been substantial technical progress in AI in the last decade or
so, resulting in systems that are capable of autonomously driving vehicles (resulting in less
accidents  than  humans),  playing  complex  games  such  as  Chess,  Go  and Dota  2  (on  a
superhuman level), translating or creating text and imitating or synthesizing speech (well
enough to pass off  as  humans).  While  we might be far  from creating artificial  general
intelligence (AGI),  then each of  these  systems is  capable  of  superhuman performance.
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Sometimes, systems are put to use before they have passed scrutiny or are used to further
selfish goals (zero or negative sum games in game theory1).
Thirdly,  there is  a lack of consensus among experts  whether and to what extent
artificial intelligence is even possible and if, then when it might be created. Some authors
are very optimistic, some very pessimistic about the possibility of achieving and probable
consequences of powerful AI systems. Armstrong et al note that expert views are from a
wide range of  „AI is  impossible“  to  „just  around the corner“  and anything in between
(Armstrong et al, 2016: 30). Such disagreement calls for philosophical reflection and the
laying of some foundation which is reasonably certain. While there is much uncertainty,
then the existence of some risks are clear.
Discussion about AI requires some discussion about intelligence. Therefore, in the
first part, I take up the task of defining and analyzing intelligence and pointing out other
related  concepts  to  consider  in  a  setting  of  risk  analysis.  The  second  part  explores
technology  –  what  have  we  achieved,  why,  and  whether  current  trends  are  likely  to
continue. Lastly, some abstract and concrete risks are pointed out, followed by noting the
existence of conflicts of values and goals, which eventually requires some solution.
1 “A zero-sum game [---] is one in which one player can only be made better off by making the other player
worse off.” (Ross 2019)
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1 What is intelligence?
The  choice  of  definitions  strongly  matters  because  the  analysis  might  miss  or
introduce  certain  aspects  of  the  phenomena,  leading  to  misleading  conclusions.  The
concept of ‘AI’ carries with itself connotations of seriousness that a mere ‘algorithm’ or
‘system’ does not. The context in which definitions are used can provide some direction,
but ultimately language is a human construct and some arbitrariness and vagueness is
inevitable.  For  the  present  purposes,  some  vagueness  can  even  be  useful,  since  some
systems might not fall under a rigid definition, yet still pose risks.
The definitions eventually used here are neither descriptive of how humans (the
larger public or experts) use these terms, nor is it normative – how they ought to be used
generally. There exist many different, often conflicting definitions and it is reasonable to
suggest that there are better fitting definitions for any particular context or goal. 
1.1 The difficulty of defining intelligence
Intelligence is not easy to define. Tentatively, I use intelligence broadly as referring
to a set of mental faculties. Partly, the difficulty stems from the recursive nature of the task
– we use intelligence to define intelligence. This creates a problem.
Human intelligence is the product of evolution over long periods of time, evolving
under  some  set  of  constraints  which  have  shaped  it.  Human  mental  faculties  exist
contingently and it is hard to point out their borders, origin, importance or independence.
This means that when defining artificial intelligence, we run the risk of requiring too much
human-likeness. A very different environment requires different faculties and it is hard to
imagine what is possible or impossible, necessary or redundant, making this to an extent a
speculative question. The world is chaotic, no set guarantees success since there is always
something  that  is  beyond  one’s  control.  The  assumption  here  is  that  different  sets  of
faculties can be functionally equivalent (or near equivalent), that the same problem can be
solved in different ways and different systems can be viable.
Therefore, we must distinguish human intelligence  from intelligence as such. One
way of achieving this is to focus on core functionality and ignore implementation details.
This allows us to be agnostic towards many interesting and otherwise relevant questions
about the nature of consciousness, moral status or whether these systems truly possess
understanding. At the same time, implementation details can be relevant, so if they are
known, they must eventually be taken into account.
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Some helpful concepts exist in the literature. Narrow AI are systems that operate
intelligently  only  in  a  relatively  narrow domain  such  as  playing  chess  or  medicine,  in
contrast  to  general AI,  which is  at  least  human level  (Franklin 2014: 16),  i.e.  able to
operate in many different domains. It is useful to think of intelligence as a spectrum and
multi-dimensional – a system is not either narrow or general, but more or less general in
more  or  less domains.  Nick  Bostrom defines  superintelligence as  any  intellect  that
vastly  outperforms  the  best  humans  in  practically  every  field,  leaving  open  the
implementation  by  which  this  is  achieved.  He  explains  that  even  if  the  probability  of
superintelligence emerging is small,  it  must still  be given serious consideration, simply
because of the potential consequences it might have (Bostrom 2003). 
1.2 Turing’s observation
According  to  Alan  Turing,  the  question  whether  machines  can  think  is  too
meaningless to deserve discussion on its own. Instead, more precise and related questions
should be considered. (Oppy, Dowe 2016)
Turing had a specific idea in mind (an ‘Imitation Game’, now more broadly called
the Turing Test) to test the intelligence of machines via their ability to deceive humans
(Oppy, Dowe 2016). A system passes the Turing test if a human interrogator, after having
written  some  questions,  cannot  say  whether  the  responses  came  from  a  person  or  a
computer (Russell, Norvig 2016: 2).
It is not clear to what extent is deception an indicator of intelligence (is it part of
necessary or sufficient conditions?). Russell and Norvig note that while the Turing test is
still relevant many years later, then “The quest for ‘artificial flight’ succeeded when the
Wright brothers and others stopped imitating birds and started using wind tunnels and
learning about aerodynamics.“ (Russell, Norvig 2016: 3). What matters is that we move
from vague concepts to more concrete ones. Additionally, while a Turing Test might not be
a good test  for measuring intelligence,  then any deception test  (including whether  the
system is capable of intentionally failing the test) is especially relevant for a risk analysis. 
1.3 Intelligence as achieving goals
Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter compile a long list of known informal definitions of
intelligence, compare them and come up with a formal definition for universal intelligence,
one that is applicable both to humans and machines. They present an informal definition
as the following: „Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range
of environments“, stressing that this contains three essential components: an agent, an
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environment and goals (Legg, Hutter 2007: 1,15). We can point out two shortcomings of
this definition for the present purposes. 
Firstly, “a wide range of environments” hints at generality. While it is reasonable to
assume  that  a  more  intelligent  system  might  be  more  capable  in  a  wider  range  of
environments, then lack of generality itself does not mean that the system is not powerful
or risky. Fundamentally, narrow and general AI systems are both engaging in the same
process. They are acquiring some knowledge that was not manually built in – they are
learning.
Secondly, “the ability to achieve” links intelligence to action or agency. Questions
can be raised about the nature of the link between intelligence and action in general – can
a system consistently behave intelligently without being intelligent? The authors defend
this link – in a section replying to John Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, they write that if
the  system  lacks  understanding  yet  performs  identically  to  a  system  that  has
understanding,  then “[...]it  is  not  even clear  to  us  how to  define  ‘understanding’  if  its
presence has no measurable effects”. However, if ‘understanding’ does have a measurable
impact, then it is of interest. The authors note that they desire a simple and very general
definition and this is easier to achieve if they abstract over the internal workings of the
agent – what matters is how well something works. The method of achieving the goal can
even be absurdly inefficient. (Legg, Hutter 2007: 41-42)
However, one could bring many modern AI systems as examples which lack any sort
of agency (insofar as providing the result of a classification task is not really agency), yet
these systems can possess dangers – agency can come from outside, from the operators of
these systems. I do not wish to only focus on AI systems themselves as risks, but also see
what they could be used for. ‘Machine ethics’ is the area of research that deals with giving
ethical  principles  to  AI  systems  in  order  to  increase  the  likelihood  of  positive  social
outcomes (Brundage 2016b: 87-88). Miles Brundage writes that „…a ‘technical’ solution to
machine ethics may mean little in a world in which unethical humans exist and have access
to advanced technology“ (Brundage 2016b: 107).
Based on this discussion, Legg and Hutter’s definition seems to be a better fit for
AGI rather than AI systems in general.
1.4 Intelligence as learning
Taking the previous criticism into account, we could separate concepts and redefine
intelligence  as  only  dealing  with  the  process  of  learning.  Prima facie,  a  system could
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possess knowledge in various domains and the ability to learn more, yet have very limited
(direct or indirect, i.e. through other agents) agency in the world. Additionally, we ought to
explicitly  think  in  terms  of  predictability,  since  ultimately  this  is  also  to  a  degree
independent of intelligence and agency. If a system is sufficiently predictable – either it is
transparent, slow or limited in some ways that it  requires human cooperation etc.  – it
poses limited risks. 
In  order  to  justify  defining  intelligence  as  learning,  we  could  look  at  two
motivations  behind creating  AI  systems.  Firstly,  we  want  these  systems to  help  us  do
something that we already can do – e.g. we want to automate tasks we find tedious, dirty or
dangerous. Yet we also want some systems to produce new knowledge or possess abilities
we lack.  In  both of  these cases,  these are  achieved,  at  least  in the  long term,  through
learning. Some knowledge can be manually built in, but e.g. in order to teach a robot to
walk,  it  must  learn it  on its  own (although through our scaffolding that  facilitates  the
learning).
How is learning achieved, what is knowledge and how is it represented etc – these
are  otherwise  very  important  details  to  work  out  (Russell,  Norvig  2016  provides  an
extensive overview of  various  aspects  of  AI  research).  As long as  the  system learns,  it
should be considered intelligent. This trio of concepts – intelligence as learning, agency as
(direct  or  indirect)  acting  in  the  world,  and  predictability,  each  a  multidimensional
spectrum – seem to be a better fit for risk analysis than mere intelligence on its own.
1.5 The problem with requiring human-likeness
There is a tendency to measure AI by comparing it to humans. To an extent, this is
understandable – human beings indeed possess more faculties than other species and this
is a good place to start. However, I wish to argue that this can be unhelpful.
Nick  Bostrom introduces  two  theses  related  to  AI  systems.  The  orthogonality
thesis states that goals and intelligence are independent variables – an AI system could
have  any  combination  of  abilities  and  final  goals.  The  instrumental  convergence
thesis states  that  superintelligent  agents  with  various  final  goals  will  have  common
intermediary goals due to instrumental reasons. (Bostrom 2014: 105). The orthogonality
thesis keeps naive optimism at bay (e.g. see Steven Pinker2) by giving a reason to consider
very pessimistic scenarios and agents that are completely inhuman. This widens the range
of systems to consider, but at the same time, the instrumental convergence thesis shows
2 Pinker argues that seeing AI as dangerous is another exaggerated doomsday scenario, see his essay at:
www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-dangers-of-worrying-about-doomsday/article38062215/ 
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the universal value of certain types of goals, meaning that they are more likely to be found
in intelligent systems, and as such, narrows the range. Powerful systems have the potential
to be more dangerous and looking for systems that have the ability or desire to acquire
more power seems a good heuristic.
Bostrom  also  brings  out  some  sources  of  advantage  for  a  digital  intelligence
(Bostrom 2014: 59-60):
 The  speed  of  computational  elements  –  biological  neurons  operate  7  orders  of
magnitude slower than modern microprocessors (200 Hz vs ~2 GHz).
 Internal communication speed – axons carry signals at the speed of ~120 m/s, while
electrical signals move at the speed of light (300 000 000 m/s).
 Storage capacity – the amount of information stored and the speed and accuracy at
which it is done can be much greater in digital systems.
 Editability – software is easier to change and improve than hardware, leading to
more experiments and improvements.
This could be supplemented with an analysis of human limitations that AI systems
need not have. Biological constraints limit us to a narrow comfortable environment, we
need to rest and sleep, we have a strong desire of self-preservation. AI systems can and
often are different, especially if they lack a physical body. Of course, self-preservation is
one of those aspects that are likely to be found in persistent systems, yet this does not have
to be as strong or as static. Also, lacking human limitations or weaknesses does not mean
that AI systems have none. However, the known advantages of digital intelligences already
constitute a major advantage.
Computer scientist Richard S. Sutton has noted that in the last 70 years of machine
learning, computational and statistical methods keep winning over methods that are based
on human knowledge. Moore’s law3 has created massive computation which has been put
to good use. AI researchers have often built knowledge into their agents, and while this has
helped in the short term, then progress is eventually achieved by opposing approaches that
are based on scaling computation. He writes that  “The two methods that seem to scale
arbitrarily in this way are search and learning” and “We want AI agents that can discover
like we can, not which contain what we have discovered.” (Sutton 2019)
This  means  that  the  best  AI  systems  are  often  not  like  us,  yet  outperform  us,
providing empirical evidence that human-centrism can be unhelpful and unnecessary.
3 Moore’s law refers to the observation that the number of transistors in a microchip double roughly every
two years. Sutton calls a generalization of Moore’s law as the ultimate reason behind the success: the
“continued exponentially falling cost per unit of computation” (Sutton 2019).
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1.6 The possibility of general AI
The ‘no-free-lunch’ theorem states that general superintelligence is a free lunch and
there  are  no  free  lunches.  Colloquially,  these  theorems are  stated  as:  „Algorithms  are
successful  only  when they are ‘tuned’  to  their  domain;  there are no universal  learning
algorithms.” (Danks 2014: 158)
Even if true, this does not rule out potential AI-s outperforming human beings, nor
does it rule out AI as such (Armstrong et al 2016: 37). Defining intelligence as continual
learning  or  adapting  seems  to  provide  a  solution.  Humans  are  to  an  extent  general
intelligences, but this is not static – we achieve generality through adapting to the goal and
the  environment,  we  modify  our  mindset,  acquire  relevant  tools  and  knowledge  etc.
Systems can adapt to their environment and goals, making the previously impossible or
hard become possible or easy – these systems can be general enough to be successful and
pose threats.
1.7 The problem with requiring generality
So, while generality can (to an extent) be achievable, it can still be unnecessary and
even misleading, since AI systems need not exist in isolation.
Consider how easy it  is  for most people in a developed country to improvise an
explosive  device  –  the  information  can  be  found  with  a  simple  Internet  search  and
ingredients can be bought without questions from construction and electronics shops. It is
fortunate that most people do not consider actually creating such devices, but it is possible
nevertheless,  and  basically  only  requires  access  to  the  Internet,  some money,  and  the
ability to read and follow basic instructions.
Now, imagine a person with the same goal, but living in isolation. This person might
not even have the knowledge of explosive chemical reactions, let alone the ability to create
the necessary materials  and assemble them together.  We have created an environment
where many tasks can be delegated to others and the free market takes care of the details.
The agent itself need not even acknowledge who they are using or the amount of work that
went into the result. 
AI systems, if they do not exist in isolation, are in a similar position. They too do not
have to possess general intelligence or even superhuman intelligence in a narrow domain
in order to achieve very impactful  goals.  If  they have access to the Internet,  they have
access to a myriad of free resources and potential helping hands to achieve their goals, as
long as they pass off as humans or find curious, naive or like-minded people – or even
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other AI systems. Most details can remain hidden behind multiple layers of abstraction
and many goals can become achievable.
One could object that the mere possibility of something happening is not enough to
cause concern – there are terrorists who drive vehicles to crowds, killing many, yet we do
not consider banning vehicles. The orthogonality and instrumental convergence theses are
relevant here – an AI system might discover and do things that humans do not, it might
find weaknesses that are not visible or exploitable for humans.
The  example  of  improvising  an  explosive  device  is  imperfect  as  it  is  mostly  a
physical process and most AI systems are not physical agents. However, we have created
and are moving even more towards a world that is digital (hence potentially accessible to
digital AI systems), where there are a lot of specialized agents and where a marketplace
exists (i.e. tasks can be delegated). A single system does not have to be general. Generality
could be achieved collectively, similarly how humans have limited knowledge and abilities,
but collectively we can achieve very complex goals.
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2 AI Technology
Frankish and Ramsey note that philosophers cannot ignore the actual achievements
AI  research  (Frankish,  Ramsey  2014:  1,  3).  This  is  especially  relevant  today  since
promising new ideas and state-of-the-art  results  are presented in some area every  few
months. I do not wish to provide an extensive overview, but merely point out that powerful
AI systems are not something to only expect from the future. Superintelligence, according
to  Bostrom,  might  come  suddenly  (Bostrom  2003),  but  powerful  and  potentially
dangerous AI technology is already here. 
I also wish to present some problems surrounding the predictions and evaluations
of  AI  technology,  discuss  the  possibility  that  the  last  decade of  progress  is  due to  the
picking of low hanging fruits, explain some reasons behind this progress and analyze a line
of argumentation that points out the limits of AI systems. 
2.1 Difficulties of predicting or evaluating AI
There are three problems I wish to point out – experts and intuition are unreliable,
goalposts tend to be moved post hoc and there exist some double standards.
Armstrong et al present tools to analyze, judge and improve AI predictions. The key
lessons that they learned are that experts are overconfident, it is important and possible to
derive  testable  predictions,  model-based  predictions  are  superior  to  those  based  on
judgment and that it is very difficult to assess the reliability of predictors (Armstrong et al,
2016: 32).  They conclude that there are theoretical  and practical  reasons to claim that
timeline  predictions  are  completely  untrustworthy  (Ibid,  46).  The  authors  analyze  the
predictions made in the Dartmouth conference and those made by Hubert Dreyfus, John
Searle, Ray Kurzweil and Steve Omohundro. The only consistent message in all predictions
were that all predictors were overconfident in their verdicts. The authors suggest future
predictors to learn from this – that they make their assumptions explicit,  their models
clear, predictions testable and uncertainty greater. (Ibid, 64)
There  is  often a  negative reaction towards  AI  achievements.  Pamela McCorduck
writes (McCorduck 2004: 204): 
“..it’s  part  of  the  history  of  the  field  of  artificial  intelligence that  every time
somebody  figured  out  how  to  make  a  computer  do  something—play  good
checkers, solve simple but relatively informal problems—there was a chorus of
critics to say, but that’s not thinking.”
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A similar point is made by Müller: “Intelligence is whatever machines haven’t done yet”.
Successful things are re-branded (e.g. to ‘machine learning’) and what is left for AI are
problems that are deemed impossible and other long-term visions (Müller 2016: 3). To be
fair, sometimes goalposts are indeed placed poorly or the critics might be different people.
The problem seems to stem from vague definitions and the lack of acknowledgment that
different systems could be functionally equivalent, leading to the possibility of  post hoc
rationalizations. Intellectual honesty calls for explicit definitions that are adhered to and to
acknowledge that there might be many different intelligent systems. As Armstrong et al
state, the predictions we make can and must be falsifiable and be based on models, not
judgment.
Lastly, there seem to exist some double standards when evaluating AI. Humans are
known to exhibit many types of biases and limitations, continuously learn throughout life,
are taught knowledge accumulated over thousands of years, can interact with the world to
test their hypotheses (i.e. are in some sense active learners). AI systems tend to be passive
learners (the data is chosen and presented by humans), are usually taught from zero and
often using noisy and otherwise imperfect data. In some sense, it should be no surprise
that many AI systems make errors that might seem obvious or comical. A human would as
well, if they were taught in a similar manner, under similar limitations.
2.2 ‘AI Winter’
It can be seen that there are exaggerated claims, hype, around AI technology today.
This high level of optimism has happened before, and once it has died down, periods of ‘AI
winters’  have  occurred.  The  relevant  question  to  ask  here  is  whether  the  current  ‘AI
summer’ is temporary, can we expect another winter period coming? To answer this, I start
with a short overview of the Dartmouth conference.
The Dartmouth conference was a conference in 1956 intended to bring together
experts for two months in the hope of making significant advances in problems related to
machine intelligence (Armstrong et al, 2016: 46). Although they proposed simple models
and  outlined  further  improvements  to  previously  successful  problems,  there  was  a
fundamental problem – they assumed that AI was a similar problem to those that they
were used to solving, leading to overconfidence (Ibid, 48). Their success could have been
due to picking low-hanging fruits and further progress could have been much harder. The
conclusion is that all the tasks mentioned in creating AI were much harder to accomplish
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than they thought. Programming concepts into computers that seem simple to humans can
be very difficult, we must avoid anthropomorphising AI. (Ibid, 48-49)
Franklin  writes  that  this  Good  Old-Fashioned  AI  (GOFAI)  type  approach  was
unsuccessful and symbolic AI went into a ’winter’ period (Franklin 2014: 21), which ended
in  the  beginning  of  the  second  decade  of  the  21st  century  (Ibid,  28).  According  to
Armstrong et al, Hubert Dreyfus pointed out an important pattern in AI research: initial
success is followed by big claims, which are then followed by unexpected difficulties and
disappointment. Dreyfus highlighted the inherent ambiguity present in human language
and syntax, claiming that computers could not deal with them. (Armstrong et al, 2016: 49-
50)
Müller states that today many classical AI problems are solved and viewed as trivial.
This  is  largely  due  to  improved  resources  –  processing  speed  and  the  ability  and
availability of large data sets. (Müller 2016: 3). An AI winter could occur again, given the
amount of hype present in the media and because progress is tied to funding, which is a
political matter. At the same time, it is very clear that useful and powerful AI systems can
be created and improved upon, making a long winter unlikely. The potential of another AI
winter should not dismiss causes for concern, as existing technology is already powerful, as
will be shown in the next section. 
2.3 State of the art systems
In  this  section,  I  wish  to  present  some  examples  of  narrow AI  that  have  been
produced in the last few years. 
OpenAI, a non-profit organization, has created a model called GPT2, which is able
to generate coherent and authentic looking text matching a given prompt. It was trained
with text from 8 million web pages and was given the simple objective of predicting the
next word, given the words that have occurred before in a given text. It is able to produce
text of unprecedented quality, especially about topics for which there is enough data (e.g.
Lord of the Rings, Miley Cyrus), however it sometimes fails at world modeling (e.g. writing
about fire happening under water), repeats text or switches topics unnaturally. The authors
have  decided  to  not  publish  the  full  model  due  to  concerns  about  potential  malicious
applications (Radford et al 2019). GPT2 is a prime example of what the quantity of data
and hardware can achieve.
Google has created Duplex, an AI assistant able to synthesize speech and schedule
appointments over the phone for the customer (Leviathan 2018). Adobe VoCo can imitate
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the speech of real people (Jin et al 2017). It is also possible to generate fake videos with
deep  machine  learning  methods.  These  ‘deepfakes’  “...are  challenging  for  both  face
recognition systems and existing detection methods, and the further development of face
swapping technology will make it even more so.” (Korshunov, Marcel 2018: 1).
We are moving beyond using AI merely for the dull, dangerous or dirty jobs. The
above  systems  are  all  relatively  narrow  in  their  domain,  yet  achieve  superhuman
performance. At the same time, not all details are known – companies tend to flaunt with
achievements when possible. It is actually in the interest of everybody if  some of these
results are cherry-picked and better systems are not yet available, giving us more time to
explore risks and prepare in other ways.
2.4 Reasons behind success and future outlooks
Some reasons can be pointed out which have helped us achieve this level of success.
As stated earlier,  Richard Sutton has stated that Moore’s law and not building domain
knowledge into the system are important (Sutton 2019).
While  some agnosticism was  claimed earlier,  then  one  strategy  has  so  far  been
proven to be productive and is likely to continue – the imitation of biology and especially
the brain. At a first glance, this makes sense, as the brain is the most complex structure we
know of and it has produced intelligence. At the same time, as stated earlier, too eager
comparisons to humans can be unproductive. Connectionism and neural networks have
become integral in the study of intelligence and cognition (Sun 2014: 109). Sun explains
connectionism as (Sun 2014: 108-109): 
“...  a  way of  capturing and understanding the mechanisms and processes of
cognition  through  building  models  using  networks  of  simple,  neuron-like
processing  elements  (units),  each  of  which  performs  simple  numerical
computations.” 
Recent breakthroughs in machine translation, speech synthesis and recognition, computer
vision  have  been  achieved  using  these  tools.  Some  algorithms  are  provided  with  the
capacity  for  memory  or  attention  (important  characteristics  of  human  intelligence),
leading  to  drastic  improvements  in  some  research  areas.  These  are  examples  of
characteristics  that  are  sufficiently  abstract  or  high  level,  meaning  that  some  human
comparisons and inspirations can be useful.
Most AI systems are not created with the hope of achieving powerful AGI, but rather
to improve the execution of some narrow task. These AI systems are tools,  rather than
potential  persons  or  animals.  Humans  desire  progress  and  better  tools,  better  AI
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technology is just a form of this desire. Given the massive infrastructure that exists that
helps to train, learn, compete, provide or order AI-related services, along with the general
desire for progress,  it  is  hard to see this  machinery of innovation significantly slowing
down anytime soon. While the examples given in the previous section implement neural
networks in some way, it is entirely likely that connectionism itself might be insufficient to
create powerful AGI and many approaches must be combined (Goertzel 2016 provides a
discussion on this topic).
2.5 Limitations
One type of  criticism of  AI systems consists  of  comparing them to humans and
showing what they cannot yet do or showing how they achieved their results through some
unfair advantages. David Danks writes (Danks 2014: 161):
„Insight and creativity are often held up as a central feature of human learning,
if  not the central  feature.  Our learning seems to depend at  times on crucial
intuitive leaps that we do not seem to be able to explain or predict.“
Lake et al (2016) analyze what seems to be an important difference between humans
and  machines  –  humans  have  built  in  software  in  the  form  of  intuitive  physics  and
intuitive psychology and humans construct causal models of the world that enable us to
learn from mistakes and hypothetical situations. AI systems in video games tend to be
better than humans because of their speed and multi-tasking ability, instead of employing
novel  strategy.  A  recent  result  of  Google  DeepMind’s  AI  in  the  strategic  video  game
Starcraft 2 was able to beat top professional players, yet closer inspection revealed that it
relied on its superhuman speed (Pietikäinen 2018). 
This line of criticism can be responded to in two ways. Firstly, as previously argued,
AI systems can achieve success and pose risks even if they are different or lacking in some
respects. A system might indeed be considered very limited and different in its abilities, yet
still achieve its goals (or bring about unintended consequences). If a property is deemed
crucial, yet equivalent or near equivalent results are achieved without this property, then
perhaps it is not as necessary as thought. This criticism is more against the creation of
human-like AGI. 
Secondly, there are many research groups working on introducing various human
faculties to AI systems – e.g. learning from mistakes (Andrychowicz et al 2018), learning
from imagination or dreams (Ha, Schmidhuber 2018), curiosity and internal motivation
(Burda et al 2018), one-shot learning (Finn et al 2017). The crucial point is that there exists
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an industry  demand,  but  also  academic and personal  curiosity  that  drives  this  type of
research.  A  previously  intimately  yet  vaguely  known  aspect  of  human  intelligence  is
defined in a computationally friendly way and experimentation with some clever insights
and powerful hardware often leads to some form of improvement of existing results.
The previous discussion tries to turn the argument for pessimism into an argument
for optimism. If we assume that some double standards exist (i.e. given what is provided to
AI systems and what they can actually achieve, they are doing well) and claim also that AI
systems lack some crucial characteristics, yet still outperform humans, then one can only
imagine the power these systems could have if these limitations are overcome. 
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3 Risks
Risks can and should be evaluated systematically, along the axes of source (humans
vs  AI),  degree  (from trivial  to  existential),  target  (from  individuals  to  the  planet  as  a
whole),  intent,  but  also their  likelihood of  occurrence and the availability  of  solutions.
However, a proper systematic analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I will
point out some inherent and some concrete risks with already existing technologies. 
This discussion builds on the choice of definitions and technological examples. The
main goal is to take the spotlight away from the cluster of superintelligence, AGI, the AI of
science fiction, that seem to be a discreet phenomena achieved at some point in the future,
and instead show how current technologies are already powerful enough to potentially lead
to very bad consequences. The most important question to ask is for the source of risks – is
it AI itself, or is it humans?
3.1 AI and unintended consequences
Amodei et al list and analyze five practical research problems related to machine
learning  systems.  The  authors  believe  that  AI  technologies  are  likely  overwhelmingly
beneficial  for humanity,  but serious thought must be given to potential  challenges and
risks. Accidents are defined as unintended or harmful behavior that may emerge when
errors are committed (Amodei et al, 2016: 1). The authors note that much of the existing
discussion  has  highlighted  extreme  scenarios,  but  this  might  lead  to  unnecessarily
speculative discussions that lack precision. They instead frame accident risk in terms of
practical issues with modern machine learning techniques. (Ibid, 2)
They  analyze  negative  unintended  side  effects,  reward  hacking  (achieving  the
reward technically, but not in the way it was intended), scalable oversight (can AI find a
way to do the right thing without assistance?), safe exploration (we want AI to explore
potential  solutions,  but  some  of  these  lead  to  bad  consequences),  robustness  to
distributional shift (how to make AI robust enough to handle the real world as well as it
handled  the  training  environment?)  (Amodei  et  al,  2016:  3).  The  authors  argue  that
problems related to AI systems are not only possible, but likely – depending to a large
extent on the people behind constructing the agent. 
On a related note, we need measurements to judge performance, but there is always
a risk that the measurement becomes a goal in itself. Marilyn Strathern has said "When a
measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure." (Strathern 1997: 308). Using AI
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systems to measure something might increase our certainty and trust in the measures,
especially if there is hype involved. Measure that are poorly chosen or become goals in
themselves can also lead to poor consequences. 
As a concrete example, consider social media that has algorithms that choose what
information the user sees on their news/content feed. These algorithms act as the user’s
attention, choosing what the user might be interested in. When given just a single goal of
keeping the user coming back, they can find very questionable strategies, e.g. keep the user
stuck  in  an  information  bubble  by  providing  it  information  it  wants  to  see.  This
information  can  be  biased  or  outright  false  –  there  is  an  abundance  of  misleading
(‘clickbait’) or outright false (fake) news. There are plenty of anecdotal stories about how
watching a couple of educational, otherwise innocent videos about Nazi Germany will soon
lead to suggestions of videos about wild conspiracy theories. These theories act like viruses
of  the  mind,  keeping  the  user  coming  back.  Surely,  we  would  all  be  better  off  if  the
algorithm cared for more than mere presence on the site?
3.2 Humans and intended consequences
In  this  section,  I  wish  to  give  two  examples  of  AI  use  that  lead  to  intended
consequences for the operators of the system, at a potential cost for others. 
The  first  is  regarding  job  automation.  On  the  one  hand,  automation  and  the
accompanied backlash has been happening for a long time (e.g. Luddites). There has been
backlash and fears, yet eventually people have adapted and new jobs have been created.
One  could  make  the  inductive  argument  that  this  will  likely  continue.  There  are  two
problems, however, with this argument. Firstly, if powerful AGI systems are possible and
eventually reached, then they can potentially do everything a human could do, potentially
on a superhuman level. Humans might become unemployable from the point of view of
profitability. However, this will probably not happen anytime soon and we collectively have
enough time to prepare. The second problem is that corporations currently have no legal or
moral obligation to create jobs. If automation yields better profits, why bother employing
humans?  If  the  wave  of  automation  comes  sufficiently  suddenly,  then  many  social
problems could arise  in  a  short  amount of  time,  even if  even eventually  new jobs  are
created – timing matters.
The  second  usage  is  to  do  with  disinformation  –  false  information  intended to
deceive. The creators of powerful narrow AI systems that generate speech, text or video
might  view  the  creation  and  spread  of  disinformation  as  an  unintended  use  of  their
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systems, but the operators might not. Recent reveals of Russia interfering into US elections
have shown how much can be achieved with organized online efforts. One does not need
high quality  deepfakes,  which might be  expensive to  produce and could potentially  be
quickly debunked, when a huge quantity of lower quality content can achieve much more.
Using AI-driven data analytics to find when, where and what to say, coupled with AI to
produce the content itself, is a dangerous combination.
To an extent,  unintended consequences seem easier  to  eliminate  or deal  with  –
systems can be thoroughly tested, in simulations and limited real environments. It can also
be decided to refrain  from the use of  a  system if  the potential  dangers  are  too  big  or
unavoidable. Humans, on the other hand, are harder to control or change. The majority of
the world might agree that autonomous weapons should not be pursued, but some major
powers ignore this call4.
3.3 Learning is inherently risky
We want AI systems precisely for their ability to learn, but learning is inherently
risky. This is because agents might have knowledge that is shared or private. There can be
knowledge about knowledge, meta-knowledge – agent A knows that B knows (or does not
know). An intelligent system can (presumably, by definition) learn and potentially arrive at
private knowledge. This is knowledge that it can use to its advantage (or its operators).
This in itself  is already a potential source of risk for whomever this knowledge is used
against. However, if the system also has the ability to deceive, it can retain private access
and create a false belief in others (potentially with the meta-knowledge of others having a
false belief), giving even further power to AI or its operators. Another way to understand
the inherent riskiness is to think in terms of known unknowns and unknown unknowns.
Learning can increase the amount of  unknown unknowns about  the system, making it
more unpredictable.
The previous paragraph was a discussion about the power and risks associated with
private knowledge, but shared knowledge can also be risky (by definition), if it takes away
some  dearly  held  belief  or  value.  To  illustrate  this,  consider  the  relationship  between
parents  and  children.  If  parents  teach  their  children  to  think  independently  and  be
interested in learning, then it is very likely that they will eventually develop some conflicts
over factual matters and values. Of course, not every idea a child produces is correct and
4 “Russia,  Australia,  Israel,  United Kingdom and United States […] are investing significant funds and
effort  into developing weapons systems with decreasing human control  over  the critical  functions of
selecting and engaging targets.” Source: stopkillerrobots.org/2019/03/minority-of-states-delay-effort-to-
ban-killer-robots/ 
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not every belief a parent has is wrong, but there can be some stubbornness, both in holding
or introducing beliefs. Whether changing beliefs and values is a risk that is to be avoided is
a different matter. 
3.4 Game theory and shared responsibility
One unfortunate aspect of technology in general  is  that in the long term we are
better off when we create systems that benefit everyone and we implement them carefully.
However, financial motives might (and indeed have) lead to the relaxation of standards.
The recent Boeing 737 Max disasters are good examples of situations where money trumps
safety. The accidents seem to have occurred due to the fact that the pilot had no way of
overriding a system, which was not developed and scrutinized properly in order to cut
down costs5. All systems are imperfect or limited, with strengths and weaknesses, and must
ultimately be overrideable. 
Bostrom analyses how the first inventor of a truly powerful AI system might get a
decisive strategic advantage over its competition (Bostrom 2014: chapter 5). This is true
also for narrow AI that gives a competitive advantage in a narrow domain for individuals,
corporations or countries. AI technology can be very powerful and goal-neutral and hence
be a useful instrument for any agent.
Finding and avoiding these ‘prisoner dilemma’ type situations is important. There is
one occurring between humans in the creation of AI technology, but another one takes
place between humans and powerful AI systems – it  is  useful  if  they require or prefer
human cooperation and mutually beneficial outcomes. As noted in the previous section,
sometimes humans are hard to persuade.  China is  a major international  power that is
heavily experimenting and exploring the potential of AI systems. They also have a history
of lack of interest in protecting human rights. It is difficult to apply pressures to China,
when states are economically dependent and might face negative consequences. There are
no simple solutions.
Miles  Brundage  analyses  research  practices  and  the  responsibilities  around  it,
stressing  the  need  for  researchers  themselves  to  bear  some  responsibility  (Brundage
2016a: 543). This seems reasonable since shifting blame is easy and a likely solution shares
responsibility  between  the  researchers,  the  companies  marketing  and  selling  and
eventually  the  users  themselves.  Perhaps  the  bigger  conclusion  to  draw  is  that  since
5 Gregory Travis provides some insight in an opinion piece: https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/
how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer 
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everyone has a stake in the consequences of AI technology, everyone should bear some
(proportional) responsibility.
3.5 The fundamental problem
One fundamental source of problems is the existence of conflicts among humans.
We believe and value different things, sometimes complete opposites. Prima facie, we can
say that some goals and values are fundamental, others are instrumental in achieving some
other  goal  or  value.  While  one  could  argue  against  having  some instrumental  goal  on
objective grounds (i.e.  it  does not  achieve  what  it  purports  to  achieve),  then resolving
disagreements over fundamental values is much more difficult.
To make matters worse, the speed of technological progress is accelerating and has
been doing so for a while. The speed of our capacity as individuals, corporations or states
to  keep up is  also  accelerating,  but  at  a  slower  pace.  If  this  continues,  then problems
accumulate. The concept of Singularity, an intelligence explosion, is the extreme example
of this phenomena, but undesirable consequences can happen much earlier.
Any type of recognition and elimination of bottlenecks is welcomed. One example of
movement in the right direction is Distill,  introducing itself  as “A modern medium for
presenting research”,  enabling interactivity in machine learning articles6.  They are also
publishing articles which deal with increasing the transparency of neural networks. Many
institutions, especially the education and legislative systems, require heavy modernization
in order to keep up. 
3.6 A potential partial solution
As stated in the previous section, some goals and values are instrumental. When
powerful technology is achieved that enables the attaining of some goal, then we have the
chance to take a step back and have a broader look – maybe the same technology renders
the current goals or values redundant?
The concept  of  reward  hacking  also  applies  to  humans.  A  business  that  creates
artificial  demand for products through aggressive marketing and has AI systems at  its
disposal could ask that perhaps the same tools could be used to find what customers really
lack or desire. A journalist could use AI systems to produce better clickbait content, but
also better quality content that reaches its intended audience.  It is  in our abilities and
interests that we collectively foster the latter decisions.
6 More info can be found at https://distill.pub/about/ 
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Conclusion
My  aim  with  this  thesis  was  to  analyze  artificial  intelligence  (AI)  from  the
perspective of risks. I defined risks as the potential of losing something of value and AI as
intelligence demonstrated by machines. 
Much  discussion  revolved  around  the  definition  of  intelligence.  I  noted  the
importance and difficulty of this task. It is important, because ‘AI’ carries with it some
connotations  of  seriousness  that  an  ‘algorithm’  does  not.  Additionally,  misleading
conclusions  might  be  reached.  The  difficulty  stems  partly  from  the  fact  that  we  use
intelligence to define intelligence, making it easy to be too human-centric. I stressed the
importance of distinguishing human intelligence from intelligence as such and introduced
Alan Turing’s idea that when evaluating whether a machine can think should rely on other
related  concepts.  While  Turing’s  own  solution  (a  Turing  Test,  a  test  of  the  ability  to
deceive) might not be an adequate test of intelligence, is it still useful to measure risks.
I presented and analyzed a definition of universal intelligence by Legg and Hutter,
which states that „Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range
of environments“ (Legg, Hutter, 2016: 12). This definition hints at agency and generality,
making  it  a  better  fit  for  artificial  general  intelligence  (AGI)  instead  of  AI  systems in
general. I continued with arguing for the necessity of separating agency from intelligence,
and defined intelligence as the ability to learn. I also stressed the centrality of the notion of
predictability. This was followed by a discussion about the potential differences between
humans and AI systems, using the ideas of Nick Bostrom. AI systems need not be human-
like and Richard Sutton has argued that this requirement has even proven to be harmful in
the long run.
Briefly,  I  considered the  impossibility  of  creating  general  AI,  since  the  ‘no-free-
lunch  theorem’  states  that  there  are  no  universal  learning  algorithms.  I  stated  that,
similarly to humans, AI systems could be dynamic and adapt to the task at hand. While
some generality is possible, I stressed that this requirement can be misleading, since AI
systems need not exist in isolation. We live in a world where tasks can be delegated to
other agents, where information is shared and accessible via digital channels. 
The second part started with some observations regarding predicting and evaluating
AI technology. Armstrong et al (2016) note that expert judgments can be very unreliable if
they are based on intuition instead of models. Sometimes, AI technology has to deal with
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moving goalposts – there are always critics to point out what AI can not yet do. There also
seem to exist some double standards. To an extent, it is no surprise that some AI systems
perform poorly – humans would as well, when trained under similar limitations.
The concept of AI winters was briefly explored. They are periods of pessimism after
short  periods  of  progress  and  optimism.  It  was  concluded,  that  another  AI  winter  is
possible, but unlikely to last long. Some recent technological achievements were presented,
among them GPT2, a text-generating algorithm, followed by a short discussion over some
reasons why the current ‘AI summer’ has been made possible. These include the existence
of high amounts of data and computational power, the strategy of imitating biology and the
brain, and the persistence of the motivation to create better tools, AI systems being one of
them.
One type of criticism against AI systems was presented – AI is often compared to
humans and it is pointed out what it cannot do well, or achieves something with some
unfair advantage. This was replied to in two parts. Firstly, AI systems can be powerful and
dangerous even while being different from humans, even when they are narrow. Secondly,
many  researchers  are  exploring  and  introducing  some  core  characteristics  of  human
intelligence to AI systems, with some success.
The last section built on the given definitions and technological examples. I noted
that the first and most important question to ask is about the source of risks – is it AI itself
or is it humans? Briefly, unintended consequences of using AI systems were discussed with
the  work  of  Amodei  et  al  (2016).  I  also  noted  that  sometimes  measurements  become
targets and with that become bad measurements, leading to bad consequences. 
I also briefly discussed intended consequences – job automation and disinformation
being examples  that favor some agents (or groups) at  the expense of  others.  This  was
followed by a short observation why learning itself can be considered risky – it potentially
introduces private  knowledge which can be  exploited.  I  employed some concepts  from
game theory, arguing that there exist  prisoner dilemma type situations which we must
collectively avoid. Shared responsibility is one partial solution to potential AI risks, since
everyone potentially has something to lose.
Lastly, I presented a fundamental fact of the human condition – the existence of
conflicts  in  values  and  goals.  These  conflicts  exist  in  a  world  where  the  progress  of
technology is accelerating faster than our collective or individual abilities to keep up. Our
institutions require modernization, otherwise problems keep accumulating. 
24
As  a  potential  partial  solution,  I  noted  that  since  some  goals  and  values  are
instrumental,  then  achieving  powerful  AI  systems enables  us  to  take  a  step  back  and
potentially  re-assess  them.  Perhaps  some of  them  are  redundant,  and  we  can  replace
negative or zero sum games with positive ones.
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Resümee: Kuidas tehisintellekt võib olla riskantne?
Käesolevas töös uurin ma tehisintellektiga (TI) seotud riske – kuidas saaks TI viia selleni,
et me kaotame midagi, mida me väärtustame? Ma rõhutan, et TI defineerimisel ei tohi me
olla  liiga  inimkesksed  ega  nõuda  üldise  intelligentsuse  olemasolu.  Ka  inimesest  väga
erinevad ja väga kitsad tehissüsteemid võivad olla piisavalt võimsad, et kujutada endast
ohtu.  Mitmed  ohud  tulenevad  TI  töö  ettekavatsemata  tagajärgedest,  ent  mitmed
aktuaalsed  ohud  tulenevad  TI  kui  tööriista  kasutamisest  mänguteoreetilistes  null  või
negatiivse  summaga  mängudes.  Ma  rõhutan,  et  tehisintellekti  ei  tuleks  käsitleda
abstraktse  tulevikunähtusena,  vaid  juba  praegu  eksisteerivana  ja  analüüsi  vajavana.
Inimeste väärtused ja eesmärgid on tihti omavahel konfliktis, ning see fakt vajab mingit
lahendust,  sest  tehnoloogia  areng  kiireneb,  võimaldades  saavutada  järjest  kergemini
erinevaid eesmärke, ent meie võime muutustega kohaneda ei jõua sellega sammu pidada.
Ühe  võimaliku  osalise  lahendusena  konfliktide  olemasolule  võib  TI  pakkuda  meile
võimalust taashinnata meie instrumentaalseid eesmärke ja väärtusi – on võimalik, et see,
mida me seni soovisime saavutada, pole enam relevantne.
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Abstract: How Can Artificial Intelligence Be Risky?
In this thesis, I research risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI) – how could AI
lead to us losing something we value? I stress that when defining AI, we cannot be too
human-centric or require the existence of general intelligence. Narrow AI systems that are
very different from humans can be powerful enough to pose risks. Many risks originate
from unintended consequences, yet many actual risks come from using AI as a tool in zero
or negative sum games, to use concepts of game theory. I stress that AI should not be
treated  so  much  as  an  abstract  phenomena  of  the  future,  but  as  an  already  existing
phenomena that requires analysis. The values and goals of humans are often in conflict
and this requires a solution, since the progress of technology is accelerating, enabling more
different goals to be achieved, and we are often unable to keep up with this pace. AI can
provide  a  partial  solution  to  the  existence  of  instrumental  conflicts  by  enabling  us  to
reconsider them – it is possible that what we have desired so far is no longer relevant.
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